

fact that the other leaders, whose names I have given, were not associated with the venture, would not have seriously disturbed Tory senti-
Doubtful ment or weakened its adhesion to the
new Government. From the point of view of the rigorous and effective prosecution of the War, there was much to be said for leaving them out. Men who come into a joint enterprise reluctantly and resentfully will, if they are honest workers—and these were—fulfil their tasks to the best of their ability, but their doubts usually revive when there are difficulties, and when decision depends on faith in leadership they are a source of irresolution. Many a time during the coming years did I find that this condition of mind in some of my leading lieutenants weakened and postponed and now again frustrated essential action. This was notably the case in dealing with the vital questions of wasteful offensives and of Unity of Command. I found that the men in question always leant towards support of the military hierarchy in opposition to the view I took. Had they remained outside, their positions could have been filled by men of the type of Maclay, Inverforth, Beaverbrook, Geddes, Lee, Weir, Rhondda, Gowdray, Albert Stanley—men who possessed organising brains of the first order, and whose services to the nation during the War have never been fully appreciated. However,

events

circumscribed my choice of colleagues.

Mr. Bonar Law, in addition to being a strong

Party man, felt that he had a special trust

Bonar Law's to discharge as the leader of his Party

loyalty to Party and his colleagues

that he had not the same freedom

to dispense with Party considerations in the choice of Ministers as had been vouchsafed to me